Deleted
Deleted Member
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Post by Deleted on Oct 28, 2014 2:54:56 GMT
Curved platforms, the guard had monitors at the rear didn't he/she? I agree the in cab CCTV trains 92ts onwards have is very good and yeah you'd be able to see more this way than the guard would be able to as the train leaving, however the drivers main duty is still to be looking at the road ahead and not 100% of his/her attention on some screens infront of them. Also the 73ts Guards would've been able to see the train out leaning from the open rear cab door? The train would've at least been able to stop if the Guard saw this woman with her scarf caught in the doors as it was leaving! When I first joined LU I was a guard on the Piccadilly line for two years. There were no monitors provided at the rear of the train. To try and see along curved platforms we had to go get off the train and go over to the platform wall. By the time we'd get back to the cab loads more passengers could've come onto the platform. We took a chance and closed the doors without a view of the front part of the train. Once we had a pilot light, most guards just used to press the signal button and as soon as the train moved off shut the cab door. We were supposed to stay out for about a third of the platform, but we never did. I'm not sure if H&S would allow someone to hang out of the back of a train these days anyway. Really? Well that's not ideal at all. Yeah you're right I can't see them allowing people to hang out of doors these days, a friend of mine is a Guard on South West Trains on the London commuter services and whilst the Class 455s don't have an interlock on the cab doors they can get disciplined if they come into platforms or depart with the cab door open, it's sad really.
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rincew1nd
Administrator
Junior Under-wizzard of quiz
Posts: 10,235
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Post by rincew1nd on Oct 28, 2014 22:24:20 GMT
Yeah you're right I can't see them allowing people to hang out of doors these days, a friend of mine is a Guard on South West Trains on the London commuter services and whilst the Class 455s don't have an interlock on the cab doors they can get disciplined if they come into platforms or depart with the cab door open, it's sad really. Whereas on Sunday the "Professional Standards Inspectors" of one Railway Company decided that if better visibility could be gained by opening the door and leaning out then that is OK as the staff involved are trained on how to hold on properly. It was impossible to say don't so it as this could increase the risk with some members of staff! On Northern the Guards have been told (post James-Street) that they must always perform their departure checks from the rear cab and remain there until the train has left the platform. I much prefer this rather than an immediate door where there is no possibility of them getting a decent view of what's going on outside. Long live the Guard and the drop-light.
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North End
Beneath Newington Causeway
Posts: 1,769
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Post by North End on Oct 31, 2014 6:50:38 GMT
The trouble with the in-cab monitors once on the move is that, even with ATO, the driver's core responsibility remains to observe the road ahead -- especially in open sections as there is the possibility of staff working on the track ahead, hazards etc. I wonder if it's only 'grandfather rights' which allows these monitors to function on the move, as on the mainline my understanding (please correct if this is wrong or out of date) is that where in-cab monitors are fitted they blank out once the train starts moving. Surely that is also substantially undermined by the TOD and PM driving? I know PM driving isn't actively encouraged, but looking out of the window clearly wasn't at the forefront of anybody's mind when designing the system. In fact I think that's one of the big drawbacks of in-cab signalling. I can't really believe that if they wanted the monitors not to function on the move that that wouldn't be a fairly easy modification to've made, e.g. when installing the TBTC equipment. Indeed I recall a post from good old aslef shrugged, which makes it sound like they take watching your train the whole out of the platform pretty seriously over on the red one: All that said I have no experience of actually using this equipment and I'm more than happy to concede all of your criticisms, but I can't quite find it likely that monitoring the CCTV on the move isn't very much intended and I think it's certainly desirable as another potential line of defence, more of a chance for someone to spot something, means that once the cab is past the headwall, you can still give the emergency stop signal and stand a chance of being seen, half an eye can be kept on it on the way out. In-cab CCTV has been a factor in very many SPADs, where the driver has been concentrating on the in-cab monitor (either in the platform or whilst on the move), and missed a red or yellow signal. On LUL this risk is tolerated because the consequences of a SPAD are likely to be mitigated by either an ATP system (e.g. Central Line) or the tripcock system, and because overlaps are designed to ensure a train should stop from maximum attainable speed then there is very little risk of a collision or derailment. Nonetheless, there is always the very small risk that the tripcock fails to work as designed (again mitigated by tripcock testers but again still leaves a very small risk), but based on the very low probability of an incident balanced against the risk of PTI incidents presumably this is considered an acceptable risk. However, there is always the risk of the driver missing something else whilst focussing on the monitors. There have been cases where a driver has missed a person lying across the track whilst departing a station, and if I were working on the track in vicinity of a station then I'd prefer the driver to be looking ahead rather than looking at the monitors. Conversely, on the mainline the risk from being distracted by an in-cab monitor on the move is very much higher, as the risk arising from a signal being completely disregarded is very much higher, although nowadays partially mitigated against by TPWS, but still the risk that the driver could miss a yellow signal and be going too fast to stop at the following red. Also not all signals have TPWS. Remember that on the mainline the signal overlap is provided to cater for a misjudgement in braking, it is *not* provided to cater for a stop or repeater signal being completely disregarded. LUL drivers are required to divide their time between the road ahead and the in-cab monitors when departing a platform, including when operating in ATO, however the main focus is expected to be on the road ahead. It is official acknowledged in human-factors studies that it is not possible for both tasks to be carried out reliably at the same time. Therefore there is no guarantee that any incident departing a station will be observed. The most important safety check the driver is required to carry out is the full check of the entire train length between the doors closing and starting to move the train. This is the same on the mainline, and is where the unfortunate guard at James Street left himself open to consequences.
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